The writer,a former ambassador, was Pakistan’s Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva and to the Conference on Disarmament.
The NSG plenary meeting in Seoul ended on June 24 without even considering India’s bid to join the group despite the Indian leadership’s strenuous efforts to seek membership. Instead, as a result of China’s principled position, supported by 11 other countries, the discussions centred on the issue of criteria for membership of nuclear weapon states not party to the NPT, such as India, Pakistan and Israel. This was a fair and equitable approach to the issue which rejected any special treatment or yet another exemption for India based on ambiguous factors such as “like-mindedness” or “merit”. The NSG is due to continue discussions on this issue without any deadline or preferential treatment for any country. Accordingly, there are several lessons to be drawn from these developments.
The first lesson is that India cannot expect to once again be given special treatment by NSG members as was the case when it was given an exemption from Full Scope Safeguards in 2008 due to American pressure on NSG members. India’s nuclear track record since its atomic test in 1974, which incidentally led to the creation of the NSG, and its subsequent tests in 1998 as well as its vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons after receiving the 2008 waiver, has finally caught up with its efforts to mislead the NSG. Accordingly, staunch supporters of non-proliferation such as Ireland, New Zealand, Austria, Switzerland and Mexico came to the conclusion that enough was enough and a clear line had to be drawn. So much so that Switzerland and Mexico, which had reportedly been persuaded by the Indians to support their NSG bid, decided to revise their positions. At the same time, countries like South Africa and Brazil which had given up their nuclear weapons programmes to join the NPT felt strongly that their sacrifices would be in vain if a non-NPT state like India was admitted free of cost to the NSG. Above all else, it was China’s principled position that encouraged these and other countries to take a firm stand.
Secondly, the outcome in Seoul demonstrates that the US no longer carries the same kind of clout as it did in 2008 to push through the waiver for India. Moreover, its efforts to contain China, and India’s blatant role in this American policy, stiffened Chinese resolve to stand firm on its principled stance. India was, therefore, mistaken to assume that support from Washington and some of its Western allies would suffice to browbeat the rest of the NSG members, especially since the group decides by consensus.
A critical consideration for NSG members was the obvious negative fallout of the 2008 exemption for India leading to greater instability and insecurity in South Asia. By now it is well known that following the waiver, India has not fulfilled the obligations it undertook such as to separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities which has enabled it to divert imported fissile material from civilian use to military use, thereby greatly increasing its inventory of nuclear weapons. Moreover, India’s additional protocol with the IAEA does not provide the required level of transparency in its use of the imported civilian fuel, raising grave doubts about civilian nuclear cooperation agreements that the country has signed. Then there are reports about the purpose and end use of India’s acquisition and development of fast breeder reactors and reprocessing plants outside safeguards, not to mention reports about Indian development of hydrogen or thermo-nuclear bombs. All these are factors that lead NSG members to seriously question India’s “like-mindedness” or its “merits” to qualify for NSG membership.
Despite the developments in Seoul, Indians will not give up their quest for NSG membership. Nor will the US relent in its efforts to help India gate-crash the group since this is a part of its strategic game plan to build up that country as a counter-weight to China. Washington’s objective is to ensure that India is recognised as a “legitimate” and “responsible” nuclear power even though it refuses to accept the NPT or the CTBT. This would not only accrue commercial benefits for the Americans and some other equally unscrupulous countries but more importantly place India firmly in the American-led alliance against China.
By contrast, Washington’s consistent opposition to Pakistan’s membership of the NSG is part of its campaign against our nuclear weapons programme, which it wants Islamabad to unilaterally freeze despite the threat to our security posed by the growing Indian conventional and nuclear arsenal, which the US has itself facilitated by the 2008 waiver. The resultant American arguments against Pakistan — its alleged proliferation and fastest growing nuclear arsenal — are not only wrong but simply a smoke-screen to cover up the discrimination that we face.
This reality has to be taken into account by Pakistan as the contest continues both within and outside the NSG. Our primary objective is to block exclusive membership for India for which our hitherto successful diplomatic efforts need to continue with even greater vigour. Our argument must be based on the need for evolving equitable and non-discriminatory criteria for membership of non-NPT nuclear weapon states. But we must be careful to ensure that India’s friends do not push through criteria that is India-specific. Towards this end we need to not only engage with the countries that have taken a firm and principled stand on this issue but also take further steps consistent with our security to enhance our credentials for NSG membership.
Beyond the NSG, we need to be tougher in our engagement with the US, the value of which is itself becoming doubtful. While we have already made it clear that there will be no compromise on our nuclear deterrence capability, we should also leave Washington in no doubt that continuing discrimination against Pakistan will lead to negative consequences bilaterally and in the region. It is not in the US interest to alienate a nuclear weapon state like Pakistan nor to cope with the consequences of a new and more dangerous nuclear and missile race in South Asia. http://tribune.com.pk/story/1136420/the-nsg-after-seoul/
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