The writer is an assistant professor at Bahria University.
“We view the Taliban as …an important partner in a peaceful Afghan-led reconciliation process. We are not actively targeting the Taliban”, Pentagon spokesman Navy Captain Jeff Davis.
This is a very significant statement given by the US Department of Defense. The Americans have been trying for peace talks with the Taliban for quite some time. Interestingly, the American President George Bush had said in September 2004 that “…as a result of the United States military, the Taliban no longer is in existence. And the people of Afghanistan are now free.” And in December 2004: “In Afghanistan, America and our allies, with a historically small force and a brilliant strategy, defeated the Taliban in just a few short weeks.”
After more than 14 years of celebrated victory and elimination of the Taliban, the Americans seem to be back to square one. They have changed their position regarding the Taliban so drastically that one can only view this as a complete failure of American control in the region.
The statement from the Pentagon becomes extraordinary after the recent battle of Kunduz which led to the downfall of the city on September 28; it was then re-taken by Afghan forces with the help of the Americans. One security official briefed on the situation in Kunduz estimated that the Taliban force in the city numbered 500 against the estimated government forces of 7,000 troops in the area.
“The problem wasn’t lack of security forces”, said Zalmai Farooqi, a district governor who had retreated to the airport. “But there was no good leadership to command these men.” This somewhat seems to be a rerun of the episode of Mosul in Iraq. As mentioned by the Americans earlier, since they are not actively targeting the Taliban, it was the first time since 2001 that they had taken control of a major city in Afghanistan. But why are the Americans doing this? If we analyse this situation critically, we can see that the fall of Kunduz holds great value for the American plan to stabilise Afghanistan.
Initially, the plan was to secure a government without the Taliban as any stakeholders in the region, and with a permanent presence of American troops to have a strong grip over Eurasia region. But after the exceptional surge in militancy the plan changed and included the Taliban as a small stakeholder along with a US-installed regime in Afghanistan as well as American military presence. For this the Americans allowed the Taliban to set up an official office in Qatar, took them off the list of terrorist organisations, released several high-profile prisoners and involved Pakistan for support.
But the Taliban under Mullah Omar were adamant for Americans to leave Afghanistan and for Hamid Karzai to removed from power and for them (the Taliban) to be given control of the ‘Afghan Emirate’ as was before the occupation. This was too much for the Americans to concede as it would mean a defeat of exceptional bounds in the international arena and a waste of billions of dollars.
The revised American plan for Afghanistan has seen some light. The change in regime in Kabul and change in leadership of the Taliban are serious factors supporting the revised plan. President Ashraf Ghani is much more open to negotiations with the Taliban as compared to his predecessor Hamid Karzai. The Taliban’s new leader Mullah Akhter Mansour has also shown more flexibility on the option of dialogue than Mullah Omar even though several Taliban leaders are still challenging his leadership. The Americans had to leave because their official combat mission ended on December 28, 2014.
The situation seems ripe for Taliban-Afghanistan-US negotiations. Any additional hindrances being faced by the three stakeholders have been somewhat eased out with the battle of Kunduz. For instance, the fall of Kunduz consolidated the leadership of Mullah Akhter Mansour. It might have convinced many voices in the Afghan regime for additional compensations to the Taliban. The Kunduz incident is yet another harsh example that if anything the war-torn country has seen in these years, it is a surge in militancy by the Taliban. The incident also provided strong justification for continued American presence in the region.
Just after the fall of Kunduz, President Obama announced that he would keep US forces in Afghanistan till 2017 as the US would not want Afghanistan to become a safe haven for militants once again. There is another important stakeholder in all this – Pakistan. The dilemma for the American and Afghan governments is that they cannot enter into negotiations without Pakistan. Even though Pakistan is not directly a party in the negotiation process, it has considerable influence over the Taliban through the tribal belt and its previous involvement during the Soviet invasion.
And it has been very fortunate for the Americans and the Kabul regime that Pakistan is actively pushing the Afghan Taliban for peace talks. Not only this, Pakistan has also provided increasing support by launching several military operations in its tribal region against the Haqqani Network and the like. This is done to punish the Taliban who are against peace talks and to pressurise others. Pakistan has done all this even though this has caused serious repercussions at home.
While things seem to be moving in the right direction for the Americans, the key player in all this is Mullah Akhter Mansour. If Mullah Mansour consolidates his control over the Taliban and is ready to accept power-sharing with Ashraf Ghani and the permanent presence of some American troops and bases, the Americans will be happier than ever. This, however, won’t go unchallenged by the dissident factions within the Taliban, who would rather follow the policies of Mullah Omar. As Afghan journalist Raza Wazir rightly points out: “The key issue the Taliban is (sic) facing regarding talks is maintaining the unity of its rank and file. For years, the ground fighters have waged war under the banner of ‘jihad’, which is why it is now difficult for them to talk with the ‘puppet government.”
For this, Mullah Mansour will have to get Pakistan’s support to control the dissident factions and make more attempts to consolidate his grip over the Taliban movement thus bringing about a fundamental shift in a 14-year policy of war. That is a tough endeavour. We wait to see whether he does this with the help of the Pakistanis, the Americans and the Afghan government, or if he sticks to the Mullah Omar doctrine of more war. http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-351677-Taliban-as-partners
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