The first round of the consultations between officials of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the US and China on how to revive the stalled peace process in Afghanistan has concluded with the agreement that there is a need for an immediate recommencement of direct dialogue between the Taliban and the Afghan government. Significantly, the quadrilateral group has also come to terms with the reality that the Taliban cannot be conceived of and engaged with as a monolith since there are many rival factions operating under the umbrella of the Taliban and the organisation as a whole lacks a strong central leader. Though this fragmentation within the Taliban is dangerous and significantly complicates the prospect of these peace talks being effective, it is encouraging to note that the four countries are not giving up on the process and are trying to come up with a framework in which to bring the various factions to the negotiations table. During the meeting, the various Taliban groups were conceptually divided into broad categories of ‘reconcilables’ (i.e. those amenable to dialogue) and ‘irreconcilables’ (i.e. those who rejected the idea of talks). Thus the major question underlying the proceedings was coming up with a strategy that would maximise the chances of the negotiations being successful by neutralising the threat posed by the irreconcilables. Pakistan’s Adviser on Foreign Affairs Sartaj Aziz took the lead and presented the proposals of his government regarding the best approach possible under the present circumstances. Noting that the primary objective of the reconciliation process was to create conditions for the Taliban groups to come to the negotiating table, he emphasised that it was critical to have adequate incentives that could persuade them to forgo the use of violence in the pursuit of their political goals. For these incentives to be effective, he continued, it was critical that proper sequencing is adhered to. Thus, from Pakistan’s perspective, it is important that all Taliban groups should be given an invitation to join the talks process and for that to have a chance of success it was necessary that there were no ‘preconditions’ and no threats of military action are bandied about before they can respond. In short, Pakistan does not want the distinction between ‘reconcilables’ and ‘irreconcilables’ to be made prematurely, and advocates waiting to formulate the rules on how to deal with the latter until all avenues to bring them to the negotiation table have been exhausted. Beyond that, there was a broad agreement to formulate the process as ‘Afghan-led’ and ‘Afghan-owned’ with the role of Pakistan, US and China being that of facilitators, since externally-imposed solutions are unworkable and unsustainable.
While the invocation that this process needs to be Afghan-led and Afghan-owned is reasonable, it hides two critical facts that threaten to undermine the platitudes expressed in this meeting. For one, over the past decade it has been clear that the Afghanistan government simply does not have the strength and wherewithal to engage with the Taliban without the backing of foreign powers, or else this four-country process would not have been required. More crucially however, for this process to be meaningfully ‘Afghan-owned’, it is necessary that there be a national consensus on how to treat the Taliban. It is not a secret that there are deep divisions, mistrust and conflicting ideologies within the Afghan polity on multiple fronts, especially when it comes to security issues. The presidency of Ashraf Ghani has been riddled with strife as the Unity Government itself is factional, many within the military and intelligence are opposed to the prospect of peace talks and view Pakistan’s involvement suspiciously. It remains to be seen how influential sections within the Afghan polity receive the proposals made by Sartaj Aziz. In all probability the approach advocated by Pakistan is likely to fuel more anti-Pakistan agitation and harm the chances of uncomplicated ‘Afghan-ownership’ of the peace process. As far as the Taliban themselves are concerned, their frequency of attacks within Afghanistan is increasing and they are becoming more and more audacious. Not only does this rising tide of attacks make the prospect of negotiations more unpopular for elements within Afghanistan, the Taliban’s rationale for this upturn in violence can either be a realisation within certain ‘irreconcilable’ factions that the Afghan security forces are weak and the foreign powers lack the political will to continue militarily, so the time is right to press their advantage and go for broke. All these factors contribute to a disconcerting feeling that despite these meetings being held, the prospects for a breakthrough are bleak. And yet there is no other way out except a political solution or Afghanistan will continue to suffer from a perpetual civil war. The implications for that are ruinous for the entire region, and arguably the world. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/editorial/13-Jan-2016/planning-for-peace
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