By Huma Yusuf
RUSSIA may have dismissed the recent violence in China’s western Xinjiang province as an ‘internal matter’, but the ethnic clashes between Uighurs and Han Chinese could have a long-term effect on Sino-Pakistan relations.
It may seem as if a showdown between the minority Turkic-speaking Muslims and Han migrants to the province has little to do with Pakistan. But the manner in which these ethnic tensions play out in the coming months could fracture the ‘all-weather’ friendship that Pakistan and China have long enjoyed.
The July 5 riots — the most recent in a string of clashes between the ethnic groups — and its fallout have made Uighurs more vulnerable to militancy. Uighur extremists and members of the outlawed East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) have already been blamed for sporadic terrorist activities. But if a militant movement that can trace its roots to Pakistan gains momentum in Xinjiang, the ire that Beijing is currently venting on the Uighurs — by detaining 1,400 of them, closing down mosques and upholding economically repressive policies — could be unleashed on Islamabad instead.
Militancy is often described as a virus that needs to inhabit a host cell with a compromised immune system in order to make the whole body politic sick. With last week’s Uighur-Han violence culminating in the closure of mosques, Xinjiang province has emerged as the perfect host cell.
Until now, Uighur Muslims’ protests against the highhandedness of Beijing have been largely peaceful. Their demands can be complied with within the framework of China’s political system — they want jobs, respect for their cultural and religious traditions and the lion’s share of benefits from the region’s energy resources. Radical Islam has had limited influence on the separatist wing of the Uighur community and they have not articulated demands for Islamic statehood or called for jihad. Uighurs practise a relatively pacifist strain of Sufi Islam and their activism is anyway curtailed by the Chinese government’s restrictions on religious activity.
The extremism that has been witnessed among Uighurs since the 1980s — when Chinese borders opened and Uighurs went on Haj or began travelling to places like Pakistan and Afghanistan — is opportunistic rather than ideological. Uighurs who have gravitated towards militancy have done so in the hope that they could count on the Muslim world for political support and funding to continue the struggle against Han Chinese domination.
All this is now in danger of changing, particularly because Beijing’s handling of the Uighur-Han violence has been poor. Friday’s decision to shut down mosques, for example, gave a religious dimension to an ethnic clash. The perception that Uighurs are being targeted for their religious beliefs, and not simply being left behind because of their ethnic, linguistic and cultural heritage, is easily exploited by militants.
In fact, a militant Uighur uprising at this point would be more a self-fulfilling prophecy than new development. In recent years, China has waged a campaign denouncing Islamic extremists and separatists that it claims are agitating for an independent East Turkestan in Xinjiang. Beijing played up the extremist threat in Xinjiang in an effort to gain sympathy in the global context of the war against terror. A rhetorical device is now closer to becoming a reality.
One of the reasons for this is the military operation currently underway in northwest Pakistan. In 2001, it was reported that up to 10,000 Uighurs had arrived in Pakistan to receive religious education. Many of these
students were also believed to have received militant training and were recruited by the Lashkar-i-Taiba and Hizbul Mujahideen to fight in Kashmir.
They continue to have a significant presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas. As the Pakistan Army’s offensive in Fata has intensified, there have been reports of militants fleeing to the Gulf states, Yemen and Somalia. There can be little doubt that many Uighur militants will escape the current crackdown by returning to Xinjiang and resuming the struggle against Han domination.
Such an influx in tense times could transform the Uighurs’ peaceful protest into all-out militancy. And a militant uprising stoked by Pakistan — however indirectly, through training, funds or logistical support provided by militants on our soil — would be cause for Beijing to reconsider the terms of its engagement with us.
More troubling is the fact that Uighur militants, as well as non-extremist Uighurs, will be returning to Xinjiang equipped with the rhetoric that fuels militancy. In April, the then outgoing Jamaat-i-Islami chief, Qazi Hussain Ahmed, said that the party had signed an MoU with China for permission to preach Islam there. He put forth the convoluted argument that the West was using trade with China as a means to bringing the nation into the Christian fold. Qazi Hussain Ahmed explained that before that could happen, the JI and other Muslim groups had to ensure that the ideological vacuum in China was filled with Islamic beliefs. This vision of China as an opportunity for Islamic expansionism is in danger of being exploited by militants to agitate for Muslim statehood and Sharia in Xinjiang.
Anticipating this, China has already cracked the whip on militant movements between Pakistan’s north-western region and Xinjiang. In April, Chinese officials met NWFP politicians to request that access to Uighur separatists be curtailed. China also asked for Uighur militants in Fata to be identified and apprehended. Now, a militant uprising in Xinjiang is in danger of being seen by Beijing as the consequence of Pakistan’s failure to follow through on its promises.
Under Gen Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan was able to preserve its friendship with China by addressing the Uighur problem head on. Uighurs as well as Uzbeks and Tajiks who sympathised with their pan-Turkic movement, were hunted down. From the late 1990s to 2003, Uighurs were expelled from madressahs and their businesses were shut down. In October 2004, Pakistani troops also killed ETIM leader Hasan Mahsum in South Waziristan. This aggressive stance against the Uighurs made Islamabad’s allegiance to Beijing on the Xinjiang issue clear. It also set aside any concerns that Pakistanis would want to extend a helping hand to their Muslim brothers and sisters in China.
A similar level of commitment will be required of the Zardari government to keep Sino-Pakistan relations intact. Given the volatility in Xinjiang, it is necessary for Islamabad to take extra measures to ensure that none of the tumult in Pakistan exacerbates the militant threat in China. As the offensive against the Taliban heightens in North and South Waziristan, where most Uighur militants maintain bases, the army should be extra vigilant and aim to capture Uighur fighters for intelligence purposes. Pakistan’s relationship with China cannot afford to become a victim of collateral damage in our war against terrorism, even if many of Xinjiang’s problems are Beijing’s own creation. http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/editorial/effects-of-uighur-unrest-379
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