the author is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C.
In 1933, Japan walked out of the League of Nations after being condemned for invading Manchuria. This act of defiance dealt a blow to liberal internationalists’ hopes that global cooperation could lead to a peaceful resolution of the Asian crisis. It also ended decades of Japanese globalization during the Meiji and Taisho periods and set Tokyo on a path of confrontation with Western powers. The ultimate result was the Pacific War from 1937-45.
Could the same thing happen today with China? Beijing’s reaction to last week’s ruling by the Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration recalls Tokyo’s rejection of the League’s attempt to rein in great-power competition 85 years ago.
The Philippines brought the arbitration case in 2013 against China’s sweeping claims to the South China Sea. But Beijing refused to recognize the court’s jurisdiction or take part in the proceedings. That was a mistake.
While Beijing had a right under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to opt out of a case on ownership of land features, this case concerned the maritime rights generated by those features. The decision is binding according to the treaty that China is party to.
Beijing has always said that its claimed holdings in the South China Sea were islands, and thus entitled to exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and various construction and administrative rights. The court found no merit in Beijing’s assertions. Instead it ruled that all land formations were simply rocks or “low tide elevations.”
The court went further and rejected any of China’s claimed historic rights to resources within the so-called “nine-dash line,” which Beijing used to essentially declare most of the South China Sea as Chinese territory. Few observers expected the tribunal would make such a sweeping ruling against China.
But while the ruling clarifies legal issues, it does little to resolve the geopolitical competition that spawned the case. Beijing made clear long before the decision was rendered that it would ignore the court’s ruling if it went against Chinese interests. Its quick and complete denunciation of the verdict now positions it against the international community.
The danger is that Beijing now sees itself even more at odds with the rest of the world than it did before. President Xi Jinping’s crackdown on civil society raised questions about the emergence of a more liberal China. Now China’s decades of deepening engagement with the world may also be at risk.
Instead of cooperating on contentious issues, Beijing may double down on policies that alarm and threaten its neighbors. If so, it must expect the international community, now backed with the sanction of law, to increasingly oppose its actions. That will make for a more fraught and dangerous period in Asia.
The conceit that international law is the bedrock of the postwar world order has always been challenged by the irreducible nature of nation-state interests. The lofty attempt to transfer to the global arena the imperfect and messy framework of a domestic legal system has given structure to great swaths of international interactions. But it has foundered in shaping geopolitical interests.
Now the legitimacy of the global legal regime may be tested by China’s response to this ruling. Beijing says its “territorial sovereignty and maritime interests in South China Sea . . . will not be affected by the award.” What will it do to assert control over those interests?
China will likely continue to harass and impede fishing boats from other nations. Vietnam claimed that Chinese vessels swamped and sank a Vietnamese boat last week near the Paracel Islands.
More provocatively, Beijing has said it will “never stop” construction in the South China Sea. It may decide to build fortifications and possibly a military base on the Scarborough Shoal, replicating its controversial land reclamation activities in the Spratly Islands. Having wrestled the shoal away from the Philippines in 2012, China could now occupy a threatening position just 130 miles from the Philippines’ main island.
With the law behind them, China’s neighbors may push back more forcefully. The potential for maritime clashes will dramatically increase. China’s sense of national honor may demand an equally assertive stance to show that it is not surrendering its interests.
The ruling also puts pressure on the U.S. to more directly support its allies and partners in the region. Washington will likely face greater demands to conduct freedom of navigation operations, and perhaps even to help prevent Chinese harassment of foreign fishing vessels. That means coming up with a coherent strategy to ensure that China’s sense of grievance doesn’t further alienate it from the global community, pushing it toward outright conflict as a way to assert its influence.
The Hague ruling didn’t solve the struggle for mastery of Asia’s seas. Instead it likely exacerbated it, increasing the risk of war.http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-takes-asia-back-to-the-1930s-1469032195
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