by Dewey Sim in SCMP, May 19, 2023
*Expansion of US$60 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor into Afghanistan ‘a win’ for the war-torn country, but China’s yields less certain
**Observers said Beijing will be hoping to reduce instability in the region while building its influence
When China’s Foreign Minister Qin Gang met his Afghan counterpart Amir Khan Mutaqi earlier this month, he spoke of the two nations as “traditionally friendly neighbours connected by mountains and rivers”.
China would stand firmly with the Afghan people, Qin said, while Mutaqi responded that his interim government hoped to deepen cooperation with Beijing on multiple fronts, including the Belt and Road Initiative.
In a separate foreign ministers’ dialogue on the same day, China, Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed to push forward with the belt and road plan’s signature project, marking Kabul’s recruitment to China’s ambitious plans for the region.
The three countries agreed that the US$60 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor will be extended into Afghanistan, as part of the scheme to promote economic cooperation and connectivity along the ancient Silk Road trade routes.
Observers said the decision to expand the belt and road plan – often viewed as Chinese President Xi Jinping’s flagship infrastructure initiative – into Afghanistan would be a win for the conflict-torn, investment-hungry country.
But they were also sceptical of the economic yields that China could reap, suggesting instead that the development should be viewed through the lens of Beijing’s desire to maintain stability in the region while building its influence.
The move should also be considered in the context of the United States’ chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, they said.
Marvin Weinbaum, director for Afghanistan and Pakistan studies at Washington-based think tank the Middle East Institute, said the expansion would be a “real boon” for Kabul.
“Afghanistan badly needs infrastructure development like roads, railroads, just about anything you can think of,” he said. “Afghanistan is a black hole as far as its needs are concerned.”
He was more measured about the potential economic benefits for China. Afghanistan has been viewed as a potential bridge with other parts of Central Asia, but there are “many other better options” for Beijing to do that in the region, Weinbaum said.
While Afghanistan also has an abundance of minerals and other natural resources, it would be a long undertaking to develop the infrastructure to extract and transport them – a “very risky” and not cost effective move.
At the same time, China has made substantial loans – especially to developing countries for belt and road projects – making it hard to see why the Chinese government would want to pour large sums into Afghanistan, with its inability to draw investment, he said.
“It’s not a population that in any way can provide consumers for Chinese goods,” said Weinbaum, who previously served as an analyst for Pakistan and Afghanistan in the US State Department.
“I’m just left somewhat at a loss here as to why China would, assuming it does, follow through with this. I just don’t see the pay-off.”
Afghanistan’s “serious security issues” could also be weighing on Beijing, Weinbaum said, citing a number of attacks on Chinese workers in the region.
In 2021, nine Chinese workers were killed in Pakistan by a suicide bomber. The Islamist militants behind the bus blast were backed by Indian and Afghan intelligence agencies, the Pakistani government said.
There was also a coordinated attack by militants on a Chinese-owned hotel in Kabul in December, prompting China to advise its citizens to leave Afghanistan.
The situation in Afghanistan has yet to improve dramatically since Washington’s pull-out and the formation by the Taliban of an interim government, Weinbaum said. “It shows what happens when you invest in a country which is as potentially unstable as Pakistan and Afghanistan.”
Beijing’s concerns were evident when Qin told Mutaqi that Afghanistan should “ensure the safety and security of Chinese personnel and institutions” in the country.
Raffaello Pantucci, senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, said China’s belt and road foray into Afghanistan – if it succeeds – could boost regional connectivity and make it easier for products and materials to move between markets.
But he suggested that investment was not a central part of the meeting between Qin and Mutaqi, pointing to Beijing’s long-standing ability to dangle potential belt and road investments to persuade Afghanistan and Pakistan to sit at the same table.
The two neighbours have had long-standing border tensions which occasionally erupt into violence.
Pantucci said the meeting was an attempt by Beijing to again pick up the role of mediator between the two countries.
“China recognises that stability regionally comes from better comity between the two of them. Not only do they not cause problems in each other’s borders, but also more widely it would help bring some stability to South Asia more generally,” he said.
Pantucci said the Chinese government has yet to commit large amounts of money to Afghanistan. There have been some aid contributions, but only one large state-linked project – an oil prospecting project in Amu Darya, he observed.
Even so, this project is being undertaken by a distant subsidiary of China National Petroleum Corporation, protecting the state-controlled entity from potential fallout from international sanctions levied on Afghanistan, he said.
To that end, Afghanistan is “not central” to the belt and road plan, but “has the potential to seriously disrupt any ambitions China has in Central and South Asia”, Pantucci said.
“An unstable Afghanistan could export violence and instability north and south, creating a major headache for Chinese investments in these countries and – even more worryingly from Beijing’s perspective – create a very dangerous neighbourhood adjacent to Xinjiang, one of China’s most sensitive regions.”
Weinbaum said the latest development indicated that Beijing is continuing to push its vision to expand its network in the region as part of its foreign policy to make friends, allies and economic partners.
China has increasingly sought to build ties with Afghanistan, while not formally recognising the Taliban regime. Last week’s foreign ministers’ meeting was the first between the three countries since the interim government took power.
Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin said the dialogue’s outcomes – which included a pledge by Afghanistan not to allow forces to conduct terrorism there – were of “great significance to the future development of China-Afghanistan relations”.
Alvin Camba, an assistant professor at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of International Studies, said the developments could mean that China will eventually officially recognise the Taliban.
While the move would enable the regime to access infrastructure funding from China – which would allow the Taliban to distribute public goods and legitimise its rule – it could be “negative”, Camba said.
“It [would] mean that governments that act outside the norms of what is acceptable can exist and thrive. In some ways, it legitimises the abuses by the Taliban,” he said, adding that it would also allow gender inequality and other features of the regime to thrive.
Camba said that even if China does not formally recognise the Taliban, it could still fund Chinese firms to pursue commercial or direct investments with Afghanistan – a similar move to Beijing’s actions when courting Taiwan’s diplomatic allies.
The success of China’s belt and road plan in Afghanistan would depend on the political and economic returns it could get, and whether it would be short-changed by the deal, he said.
“Afghanistan is an important former US-occupied region with a lot of resources to offer.”
Camba said that branching into Kabul could also allow China to signal to surrounding regions – from Central Asia to South Asia and the Middle East – encouraging countries to continue borrowing Chinese money.
According to Weinbaum, China is also trying to fill the vacuum left by the American withdrawal from Afghanistan. And it “made sense politically to have friendly government ties with Kabul”, he said.
China has engaged more visibly with the Taliban than any of its other neighbours. In an opinion piece last year, Pantucci pointed out that Beijing’s embassy in Kabul had pushed for the Taliban’s inclusion in regional forums, while Chinese institutions offered millions of dollars in aid.
“Beijing rarely wastes an opportunity to condemn the abrupt withdrawal of US forces … and contrast it with China’s own contributions,” he wrote.
Marina Kaneti, assistant professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore, said China’s engagement with Afghanistan was “indelible” from its new approach to global diplomacy.
It could be read along the same lines as Beijing’s recent exchanges with Iran and Saudi Arabia, and the success that came with the peace deal it brokered between the two Middle Eastern nations, she said.
“In other words, Beijing will use Afghanistan to continue re-drawing the limits and possibilities for international engagement and world order. If Afghanistan is a piece of a larger geostrategic play, then the very possibility for engagement and negotiations can itself count as success.”
Pantucci said Afghanistan could still be a “huge boon” to China – but he did not see that happening any time soon.
“Unfortunately, the stubborn nature of the Taliban authorities makes it highly unlikely we will see either positive outcome, though at the same time it does not guarantee a negative one,” he said.
“What is likely is that Afghanistan will be an irritant to China’s regional ambitions and one that China will continue to seek to manage and ignore, but will inevitably find itself having to play a role in trying to fix.” https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3221012/china-banks-stability-kabul-belt-and-road-agreement-experts?module=lead_hero_story&pgtype=homepage
