The author is a PhD holder and a research fellow at the Sejong Institute in Seoul
With the deployment decision of THAAD, the much-touted “honeymoon” period between Seoul and Beijing is over, but it doesn’t mean that the couple will divorce. Very few people divorce after they return from the honeymoon, even though they have to face the reality of everyday life.
From South Korea’s perspective, it was a very difficult decision to make. I knew it personally because I attended some of the discussions on the pros and cons of THAAD. There are technical aspects that other experts are more qualified to comment on. So, I will touch upon the “thinking process” on the part of South Korea, especially where it is relevant to China.
First of all, THAAD was not a “new” issue. Seoul and Beijing, together with Washington, have been discussing it through diplomatic channels over the years. Even though it was made public two years ago, experts in China and South Korea were not strangers to the matter. The issue was also on the table at the recent US-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue, held in Beijing. So, it was not a sudden, out-of-the-blue insult Seoul and Washington staged to catch China off-guard.
Second, many Chinese friends are disappointed with South Korea’s decision on THAAD. But they don’t seem aware that South Korea’s decision was, actually, based on its own disappointment with China, mainly about North Korea. Seoul has invested an inordinate amount of diplomatic resources to get along with Beijing, expecting that Beijing would reciprocate Seoul’s outreach by containing North Korea’s belligerence. President Park Geun-hye even risked her relationship with America by deciding to attend the military parade last year, hosted by Chinese President Xi Jinping. She was the only leader of a country that is an American ally.
Beijing initially appears to reciprocate in this direction with a good will, by joining the international community to mete out punitive measures against North Korea’s nuclear tests. But its actions have been always called into question as not enough to stop Pyongyang.
For South Koreans, it was somewhat odd to see why globally “responsible stakeholder” China couldn’t deal responsibly with North Korea, often giving the impression that Beijing actually “protects” the regional trouble-maker whose nuclear and missile ambitions are a common geopolitical liability, even to China itself as well. When North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test in January, she held an emergency phone consultation with US President Barack Obama and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. But what South Koreans were eager to see was a picture of Park consulting Xi over the phone. That would have sent a clear signal to people that Beijing cares about Seoul. Unfortunately, it didn’t happen until a month later when South Koreans had already given up hope in China.
Likewise, China’s acts have been called into question in many occasions when it comes to North Korea. For instance, in the aftermath of the sinking of South Korean navy corvette Cheonan in 2010, China simply called for “calm” in both Koreas. I remember at that time South Koreans were outraged by China’s attitude, which amounts to asking a robbery victim to be calm and not do anything as the robber walks away.
Third, against the backdrop, over the years, South Koreans have come to have awareness that they cannot solely rely on China to check North Korea’s belligerence. North Korea has been upgrading its nuclear and missile capabilities, exposing South Korea to ever more serious threats. Pyongyang often threatens to turn Seoul into “a sea of fire.” With Beijing not offering any assurance of how it will stop North Korea or protect South Korea, Washington suggested THAAD. In the eyes of South Koreans, Washington appeared to be a more genuine friend.
North Korea has so far conducted four nuclear tests, each time demonstrating more advanced technical achievements. Now, it claims to be a nuclear power. It is also near completing building an intercontinental ballistic missile that can reach halfway around the world. It’s a fair question to ask China what it has done to stop North Korea.
Finally, the issue of whether China will revenge South Korea for agreeing to deploy THAAD. Here, I urge my Chinese friends to be more strategic. China, as a big and resourceful country, has the will and capability to corner its smaller neighbor South Korea. But what good, at the end of the day, will it bring to China’s regional interests, especially vis-à-vis the US? For instance, if China really pushes South Korea, South Korea will be pushed. But where will it be pushed to? South Korea will be pushed closer toward the US and this will strengthen the US-led trilateral Washington-Seoul-Tokyo military structure, resulting in a “new Cold War.” Is this what China wants?
China may claim to be a victim of THAAD deployment, but it should be aware that, from Seoul’s perspective, South Korea has been a victim for a long time of North Korea, while China looked the other way. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/993840.shtml
THAAD threatens return to Cold War thinking: Global Times, July 12, 2016 at 19:00:49
(by Global Times reporter Liu Jianxi based on an interview with Cui Zhiying, director of the Korean Peninsula Research Center at Tongji University)
The Beijing-Seoul relationship has been under the spotlight in recent years, especially after Seoul announced Friday the deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to counter a string of nuclear attempts by Pyongyang. Some scholars conjecture that while South Korea is under pressure to develop friendly ties with China, the latter has not shown enough support for the former on North Korea’s nuclear issues, which is to blame for the South Korean government’s decision to deploy the THAAD system.
Beijing has been consistent in its policies on the Korean Peninsula all these years, striving to maintain friendly ties with both Seoul and Pyongyang. It is Seoul that has misinterpreted Beijing’s diplomatic polices, wishfully thinking that as long as it builds an intimate relationship with Beijing, Beijing will keep a distance from Pyongyang. This zero-sum mentality is not what China pursues. Beijing endeavors to maintain stability and peace in Northeast Asia, to which good-neighborly relations with both North and South Koreas are a prerequisite. The Cold War mentality no longer meets the requirements of the 21st century.
The South Korean government has its own calculations on THAAD deployment. However, the defense system will bring more harm than benefits to Seoul if deployed. As well as being expensive, the THAAD system is not technologically strong and thus will not make much difference to South Korea’s security. THAAD, as a radar system, is expected to put local citizens’ health at huge risk, and thus has already met domestic protests even before being deployed.
More importantly, the missile defense system will definitely exert negative effects on the China-South Korea relationship, as Seoul knows. The Chinese side has explicitly aired its concerns and oppositions to the deployment of the system. With its monitoring scope going far beyond the defense needs of the Korean Peninsula and reaching deep into the hinterland of Asia, the THAAD system will pose a direct threat to China and other countries in the region.
However, Seoul is still showing high interests in deploying the system. Its real intention is to use THAAD as a bargaining chip to pressure China over North Korea’s nuclear issues. Fully aware that Beijing is unlikely to join it in countering Pyongyang, Seoul is thus taking advantage of THAAD to force the Chinese government to take a tough stance over the nuclear issues. South Korea’s calculations will not succeed. Beijing’s policy over the Korean Peninsula is made based on its own national interests and strategies, rather than those of Seoul’s.
Some believe that the special bonds and sentiments between Chinese and North Koreans, exemplified by Chinese’ participation in the Korean War, have played a significant role in China’s policies on South Korea. Beijing and Pyongyang share a time-honored friendship. However, the situation in Northeast Asia has seen dramatic changes since the end of the Cold War. The previously hostile relationship between Beijing and Seoul has developed into friendly and mutually beneficial ties during the past decades. In the modern times themed by cooperation, China endeavors to develop intimate relations with both Koreas.
China’s own national interests are prioritized in its diplomatic policies. Beijing is now focusing on modernization, and is pursuing stability and peace in the Korean Peninsula. However, Pyongyang’s efforts in developing nuclear weapons have put the peninsula’s and Northeast Asia’s stability at risk, and will harm China’s national interests. Despite the time-honored friendship with Pyongyang, Beijing will not and should not sacrifice its national interests for Pyongyang’s nuclear aspirations. Denuclearization in the Korean Peninsula is the political basis for the development of China-South Korea relationship.
Above all, China will not give in to South Korea’s THAAD threats, nor tolerate North Korea’s nuclear ambition. The Cold War mentality is outdated in today’s world, and China aims for good-neighborly relations with both Koreas. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/993824.shtml
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