A potent deadlock: by Gibran Peshimam in The News on Sunday, October 16, 2016

Just before the 2013 general elections in Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif spoke at an event in Lahore outlining his India policy.
“The entire region has suffered because of our failure to appreciate the negative fall-out that arises from subordinating economic realities to political considerations,” lamented Nawaz. The two-time premier went on to sweep the elections on the back of promises of development and prosperity — and normalisation of relations with India, and subsequent economic cooperation, was a big part of this plan.
Nawaz Sharif has always been big on normalisation of ties with India. It is no coincidence that biggest steps forward have been taken in his governments.
Yet, call it ‘coincidence,’ it is also in his terms that the biggest setbacks have been suffered — that too after periods of progress. The biggest example of this was the historic Lahore Declaration being followed ‘coincidentally’ by Kargil.
Nawaz Sharif has had the uncanny knack to pull back relations with India from the most unfavourable of situations. But none of it has been sustainable.
The tit-for-tat nuclear explosions in May 1998 during Nawaz’s second term as premier saw both sides of the border drowned in jingoistic fervour. Yet months later we had Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee on a bus crossing Wagah, received by Nawaz himself — a visit that culminated in a forward-looking Lahore Declaration. It was a big achievement by any standard.
During Nawaz’s third term as Prime Minister, Narendra Modi’s sweep of the 2014 elections brought a wave of nationalism in India, but was also accompanied by a wave of trepidation and fear in Pakistan that relations with India would sour given the new Indian prime minister’s history of communal violence and an election campaign containing a fair bit of Pakistan-bashing.
Yet, we saw Nawaz take the initiative to board a plane at the 11th hour to attend Modi’s swearing in, dispelling a large part of these fears. The two have developed strong relations (personal, at least) ever since.
Months after the ceremony, relations once again ‘coincidentally’ soured with sustained days-long clashes along Kashmir’s LoC, leaving soldiers dead on both sides. There was talk of beheadings and revenge and calls for blood. Yet, soon after, Nawaz had Modi visiting his home in Lahore in a surprise visit that once again broke a streak of pessimism on India-Pakistan relations.
Just a few days later, we ‘coincidentally’ had the Pathankot attack in India, and an air of renewed hostility with assertions that the militants had come from Pakistan.
Nawaz moved quickly and Modi remained largely silent, possibly because of their personal rapport. There was unprecedented cooperation (at least initially) on the Pathankot investigation and we had the two National Security Advisors meeting. Relations were salvaged.
Then came the Kulbhushan Yadav story, and accusations of Indian involvement in subterfuge in Pakistan. But Nawaz didn’t take the bait.
The prime minister’s only comment on the matter, that too in passing during a short, informal press interaction in London, was that both sides should stop the spy games against one another.
It was clear that Nawaz was determined to belie traditional triggers and keep moving forward on relations, and he had a willing partner.
But this determination has once again been doused by two major events — the uprising in Indian Kashmir and the attack on a military base in Uri, also in the Indian Kashmir. This time, however, the fallout from both events has been too heavy for the two to bear and power through.
The Kashmir uprising following Burhan Wani’s murder and India’s brutal suppression of the ensuing protests has captured the imagination of the people of Pakistan. This has meant that Nawaz has had to not only take one step back from his advances towards normalisation, but also castigate India. This castigation has come not only domestically following high-level meetings but internationally at the UN General Assembly in a hard hitting speech. Interestingly, hardliners in Pakistan still felt he didn’t say enough (such as highlight the capture of ‘Indian spy’ Kulboshan Yadav).
But Uri was really the breaking point.
As the plumes of flames rose from the Army garrison Uri, an intransigent normalisation process went up in smoke. Uri left 18 Indian soldiers dead and a wave of anger and militant nationalism sweeping through India. Unlike after Pathankot, the statements hardened from India. Modi eventually spoke on the attack — and his message had clearly toughened, though some argue that it could have been a lot stronger than the taunts he threw at Pakistan.
India upped its diplomatic blitz by boycotting the Saarc summit to be held in Islamabad, and was followed by a few other members, too.
Then came claims of a supposed surgical strikes by India on “militant launchpads” along the Line of Control. Claims and counter claims raised temperatures even more.
As it stands, normalisation once again seems elusive.
Pakistan is now stressing, more than ever, that the matter of Kashmir needs to be solved before matters can proceed; India is now stressing, more than ever, that Pakistan act against elements sponsoring cross-border terrorism before matters can proceed.
We stand at a potent deadlock.
But given Delhi and Islamabad’s standing in international capitals, and the global narrative on terrorism, it is clear that Pakistan will need to move first.
That will entail not only “turning off the tap” — like Musharraf did in 2002 — but showing concrete action against Kashmir jihadists roaming free in Pakistani territory.
It is clear when you speak to those in the corridors of power that Nawaz still wants to move forward on India.
But how? Prime Minister Sharif is stuck in a difficult spot.
Buoyed by Kashmir’s latest uprising, the anti-India and pro-Kashmiri jihad element in Pakistan’s powerful and praetorian establishment is stronger than ever.
On the other hand, the pressure to act against jihadist elements supporting, if not perpetrating, cross border attacks into India is higher today than it has ever been. Not only because of India’s increased pressure, but given United States’ stand on the matter. Usually neutral on the face of it, Washington has been more partisan on issues plaguing India-Pakistan relations than ever before.
Statements by the US State Department and the US’ National Security Advisor — the latter coming at the same time as the purported surgical strikes — minced no words identifying elements behind cross border attacks into India, and in the need for Pakistan to act against Kashmir-focused Jihadi organisations, such as Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba. In fact, it went as far as to clearly state that Uri was a case of a cross-border militant attack, despite Pakistan’s fervent denials.
In many ways, the pressures Prime Minister Sharif faces also present his greatest opportunity to isolate jihadist elements and their supporters in Pakistan.
For one, the US pressure is distinctively dangerous.
Consider that, whether or not the surgical strikes happened, the fact that the US would put out such a supportive statement in favour of Delhi at a time India made such a major and unprecedented claim of crossing into Pakistan will have set off alarms in Islamabad.
Nawaz can use this pressure as leverage for a domestic policy shift. But that will not be enough. He needs more help. For one, unlike the past, he has an opposition he can work with. The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) has already started giving statements supporting action against jihadist elements. He needs to take them on board on this matter, too, and build an across-the-board political consensus on a crackdown focused against “benign jihadists.”
Then there is now also the added factor of China. China’s influence and acceptability has grown in Pakistan over the last few years. The 46-billion-dollar corridor that promises to change Pakistan’s economic fortunes through Chinese investment has become the new sacred cow in Pakistan. Beijing’s influence over Pakistan’s security establishment has also steadily grown.
Instability in the region, and conflict with India, threatens to compromise CPEC, giving Nawaz more space. China has also offered to mediate between India and Pakistan.
Prime Minister Sharif has his outs, but he needs to move decisively this time. Simply letting this blow over may be tempting; but then he should know that the next time he takes that big step towards the goal of economic development through regional cooperation, there will be yet another ‘coincidence’ waiting to happen.
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